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in Schwartz. The Mills case should have been deemed controlling. As
the Court of Appeals stated in Molino v. County of Putnam: 3
The statute which imputes to an absentee owner the negligence of
his driver, for the purpose of imposing liability to an injured third
party, does not impute contributory negligence to such an absentee
owner in his action to recover his own damage.
There was no indication in Schwartz that Mills was overruled. It
is apparent that the plaintiff-owner was entitled to litigate the defendants' responsibility for the property damage to his car. The plaintiffowner's own negligence was not in issue in the first action, so there was
no basis upon which he could be collaterally estopped in this action.
Indeed, the plaintiff-owner should have been granted summary judgment, since the prior action established the defendants' negligence and
since there was no basis for finding that the plaintiff-owner was contributorily negligent.
ARTicLE 41

-

TRIAL BY A JURY

CPLR art. 41: Verdicts modified by court where jury failed to render
verdicts required by its own findings.
Welborn v. DeLeonardiI37 joined three separate negligence actions
based on the alleged negligent operation of two motor vehicles. In
action one, plaintiff 1 (P1), a passenger in the car owned and operated
by defendant 1 (D1), sued D1, D2, the lessor-owner of the other vehicle,
and D3, its lessee-operator. By verdict, P1 recovered against Dl. In action two, in which DI sued D2 and D3, there was a hung jury. In action
three, P3, a passenger in the vehicle owned by D2 and operated by D3,
sued Dl, D2, and D3. A verdict was returned in that action in favor of
P3 against D2.
Thereafter, pursuant to CPLR 4404(a), 138 motions were made to
set aside the jury's verdicts and for a new trial in actions one and three
because of the inconsistency of the verdicts. P1 also moved for a directed
verdict in action one against D2 and D3 because of the jury's finding of
negligence in action three. In addition, D2 moved for judgment against
Dl in action two on the basis of (1) the verdict rendered in action three,
and (2) D l's motion for a new trial in actions one and three.
136 29 N.Y.2d 44, 49, 272 N.E.2d 323, 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d 817, 821 (1971), discussed in
The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. Ra. 355, 374 (1971).
137 68 Misc. 2d 853, 328 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).

138 CPLR 4404(a) states that after a jury trial, a party or the court itself may move
to set aside a verdict or order a new trial where (1) the interests of justice so dictate; (2)
the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence; or (3) the jury cannot agree after
deliberating for a reasonable time.
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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

On the basis of its inherent power to apply principles of law to a
jury's findings where the "jury just simply refuses to render the required verdict; so long as in so doing the Court does not... substitute
findings of its own for those of the jury,"'139 the Supreme Court, New
York County, amended the jury verdicts in actions one and three. In
court-completed verdicts in actions one and three, P1 and P3 recovered
against Dl, D2 and D3 for the amounts the jury had previously awarded
PI and P3. All other motions, with the exception of D2's motion in
action two to dismiss Dl's complaint, were denied. 140
At first glance, Welborn is a noteworthy example of judicial enterprise since the decision logically interprets the jury's findings of liability. It may be argued, however, that the court should have followed the
usual practice of giving the jury a second opportunity to follow its instructions and thereby render the completed verdicts itself. 141
CPLR 4104: The six-person jury.
This section, which had permitted a party demanding a jury trial
in civil cases to specify a jury composed of twelve or six persons, has
been repealed. 14 The new CPLR 4104 limits to six the number of persons who shall compose a jury in civil actions. In keeping with this
change, CPLR 4105 has been amended to specify that the first six persons who are approved must constitute the jury. Similarly, under CPLR
4109, the number of peremptory challenges has been reduced from six
to three, and, under CPLR 8020(c), the jury fee has been reduced.
Six-person juries will "result in a substantial saving of time and
money to the state, to litigants, and to jurors and their employers, without any substantial reduction in the quality of justice."' 143 In New York
County, it will ease the currently acute problem of obtaining qualified
jurors.
ARTicLE 44-TRuIL MOTIONS

CPLR 4402: Mistrial motion must be made before verdict.
Failure by trial counsel to make a timely objection to the court's
rulings precludes review of the issue on appeal unless the appellate
139 68 Misc. 2d at 857, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
140 Id. at 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
141 See 4 WKM 4404.22, citing Note, Inconsistent Jury Verdicts in Civil Actions, 37
NEB. L. REv. 596 (1956); cf. Jacquin v. Syracuse Auto Rental & Taxicab Corp., 263 N.Y. 53,
188 N.E. 154 (1933).
142 L. 1972, ch. 185, at 402, eff. May 28, 1972.
143 4 WKSM
4104.06.

